

1918—



—1944

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

An interpretation of current international events by the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, Incorporated

22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y.

VOL. XXIV, No. 3

NOVEMBER 3, 1944

WILL ELECTIONS RESULT IN GREATER INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION?

BY offering its platform to President Roosevelt and Governor Dewey for presentation of their views on this country's foreign policy, the Foreign Policy Association—a nonpartisan organization representing all shades of political opinion—believes it has fulfilled its objective which, as stated in its constitution, “is to carry on research and educational activities in the understanding and constructive development of American foreign policy.” President Roosevelt accepted the invitation of the Association, while Governor Dewey decided to state his views, already presented in Louisville on September 8, at the *Herald Tribune* Forum on October 18, and again—this time in answer to the President—in Minneapolis on October 24. Meanwhile, members of the Association in branch cities have had an opportunity to hear other Republican spokesmen. In each instance the Association, as has been its practice during the twenty-six years of its existence, has made no attempt either to support or censor the views expressed by the speakers. To have done so would, obviously, have been to violate the American tradition of free speech, which applies to every citizen, whatever his rank.

ISSUES STILL UNDER DISCUSSION. The ensuing debate has done much “to aid in the understanding and constructive development of American foreign policy.” Both Presidential candidates have affirmed their determination to support an international organization, and to prevent attempts to render it ineffective once it has been established. In fact, there is today no responsible person speaking for either party who would go on record as opposing international collaboration. This, in itself, is a recognition of the deep and genuine anxiety felt by the American people concerning problems of national security, and can be considered a marked improvement over the partisan bickering over “Wilson’s League” that prevailed during the 1920 campaign. There are three main issues, however, which continue

to trouble conscientious voters.

1. **REVIVAL OF ISOLATIONISM.** The first of these is the indubitable revival of isolationist sentiment. Those of us who live on the eastern seaboard tend to indulge in the pleasant illusion that isolationism is dead, and will not rise again to plague the makers of post-war foreign policy. Even a brief contact with the Middle West, however, should dispel that illusion. There, in several prominent newspapers, cynical attacks on the Dumbarton Oaks document go hand in hand with unremitting criticism of Britain and with hostile insinuations about Russia. Anti-Russian sentiment is coupled with aspersions on the Political Action Committee, described as a tool of Stalin, and with open attacks on the “foreign-born” (a term made to appear synonymous with Communist)—this in spite of the fact that few areas of the United States are so thickly settled by persons of non-Anglo-Saxon origin as Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Chicago, with its large Polish and Italian population.

2. **ATTITUDE OF CONGRESS.** Were this revival of isolationism merely a local phenomenon, which would leave the formulation of national policy unaffected, it might be dismissed as the inevitable reaction of some of our citizens who live in areas remote from both Europe and Asia. The fact, however, that strong isolationist elements are already represented in Congress, which under the constitution participates in the making of foreign policy, has a direct bearing on the issue now before the voter. Unless, as Senator Ball has urged, the isolationist elements can be defeated in elections for Congress, either of the Presidential candidates will be faced with the same problem—that of obtaining the support of Congress for effective participation by the United States in the international organization backed by both parties. This problem will not necessarily prove easier for Mr. Dewey than for Mr.

Roosevelt. For while the next House may be Republican, the Senate, which ratifies treaties, is more likely to have a Democratic than a Republican majority. The Republicans contend that Mr. Roosevelt, who in the past has had many clashes with Congress, will prove unable to obtain its collaboration on foreign policy, and will be opposed not only by Republicans, but also by anti-Administration Democrats. The Democrats, for their part, raise the question whether Mr. Dewey will have the zeal and determination to press for Congressional support of a United Nations organization when confronted with strongly entrenched isolationist elements of his own party who have shown no signs of a fundamental change of heart. The attitude of Congress assumes paramount importance in view of the fact that it is Congress which will have to grant authority to the American delegate on the proposed Security Council of the United Nations organization to act in an emergency calling for the use of force. Both Presidential candidates have stated that Congress must decide on this point.

3. "SECRET DIPLOMACY." One of the chief criticisms made of the Administration's foreign policy during the campaign has been that the President engages in secret personal diplomacy, sending personal agents abroad, setting up new agencies to deal with various aspects of international affairs, and by-passing the State Department. Under the constitution the President has the power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties; and to nominate and, by and with the advice of the Senate, appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls. A President only slightly concerned with foreign affairs could make minimum use of these powers, while a President profoundly interested in that field could expand them to a maximum. It is natural that, in time of war, when foreign policy is no longer a matter of academic interest but a matter of life and death to every citizen, the President in office should want to participate more actively in its formulation than he might be inclined to do in time of peace: this was just as true of Woodrow Wilson in World War I as it has proved true of Franklin D. Roosevelt in World War II. The criticism could be justly made that Mr. Roosevelt has been lax in consulting his cabinet as a body on problems of

world affairs. At the same time, it must be admitted that the manifold exigencies of a global war, and the vastly increased diplomatic activities of the United States have expanded far beyond the capacities of the State Department as originally set up. The Executive is, and will continue to be, faced with the alternative of either thoroughly reorganizing the State Department so that it can act not only in the field of diplomacy but also in the many new technical fields involving international action, or of establishing new agencies to fulfill special functions for which the State Department is at present not adapted.

When judging the record of any administration in foreign policy, we must bear in mind that the Executive, in advancing this country's interests, must inevitably reach compromises with other nations, each of which is also pursuing its own interests—compromises which may again and again fall short of our ideals. To assume that on every occasion the United States will achieve its objectives one hundred per cent is to assume that we can follow a lone-hand policy—and yet obtain the acquiescence of all other countries in whatever we propose to do. This is clearly impossible. When it comes to responsibility, the President is directly accountable to the voters—as he will be on November 7—in a way not paralleled in the case of the State Department, composed of appointed, not elected, officials. It is doubtful that any future President will want to withdraw from direct participation in the making of foreign policy; and even more doubtful that he would escape the public criticisms which, in this country, are invariably the lot of incumbents in office.

The central fact of the campaign debate is that the United States, since 1914, has been effecting a transition in foreign affairs from the stage of adolescence to that of maturity. This is admittedly a painful transition, and mistakes have been made in the process by all who have been engaged in the formulation of foreign policy. By the time this war is over, the world we live in will have been changed beyond even our present imagining. A bold imagination, and courage to face new situations without dismay, will be the prime requisites of statesmanship.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(This is the second of two articles.)

STILWELL RECALL OBLIGES U.S. TO REVIEW POLICY ON CHINA

The recall of General Stilwell from his command in the China-Burma-India theatre and from his post as chief of staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek reflects the difficult military and political situation inside China, where the Japanese have made important advances in recent months. At the same time the historic defeat suffered by the Japanese Navy during October 22-27, when it lost 24 warships (including four carriers and two battleships) in the Second

Battle of the Philippine Sea and suffered damage to 34 other vessels, is symbolic of the war in the Pacific, where things are going badly for the enemy. The military effort against Japan is being fought with two arms: the left—on the continent of Asia—is weak and battered; the right is delivering mighty blows in the Pacific area and is gaining in power every day. Although there is no question as to the ability of the United Nations to defeat Japan in the long run,

this uneven situation is dangerous, and it would help matters a great deal if the left arm in China and India could be strengthened.

AMERICA'S TWOFOLD POLICY. Stilwell's withdrawal, as announced from Washington on October 28, is part of the developing crisis in China, a crisis which inevitably has repercussions in Chinese-American relations. The United States naturally has not been able to overlook the serious shortcomings of China's war effort or the presence in high circles of obstructionists, such as War Minister Ho Ying-chin. Unquestionably many of China's weaknesses have arisen from the length of the war and the stringency of the Japanese blockade, but resistance to Japan could be far more effective if Chungking were willing to join in genuine political cooperation with other groups, to carry through essential military and economic reforms, and abandon the idea of some day ~~worst assisted group; an international~~ Spanish Intellectuals, on October 10 urged "every conscientious Spaniard" inside the country to "dedicate himself to rid Spain of her present totalitarian régime"—has summoned Spanish Republicans in exile to meet in Toulouse, France, from November 2 to 5. The news about Spanish activities along the border, however, is unclear, and must be viewed with reserve for the time being.

POWERS CONSIDER SPANISH POLICY. The first question asked by the United States and other foreign governments is whether the raids from France foreshadow real rebellion. The Brazzaville radio on October 23 reported that the spark in southern France might ignite all Spain. The Supreme Junta in France claims some support in Spain; on October 24 Spanish Republican headquarters in London announced through its newspaper, *Conquest of Spain*, that the underground Republican Junta in Madrid had summoned Spaniards to a civil war to overthrow Franco. On October 28 unofficial information from Spain reported that Spanish Maquis from France had seized the village of Canejan in Catalonia and repulsed the efforts of government troops to retake it. But, although reliable observers estimate that 85 per cent of the Spanish population opposes Franco, the prevailing official opinion is that the raids along the Spanish border will not soon develop into revolution because his opponents are weakened by divisions among themselves.

The possibility of civil war is strong enough, however, to cause foreign governments to consider the policies they might follow should it occur. The Spanish situation is a test of the Allies' ability to work together during the years ahead, and their attitude on Spain will indicate whether the mistrust that sundered the world on the issue of the Spanish civil war from 1936 to 1939 will continue to be a disturbing factor in international relations. Although the

East because of its own internal divisions, and possessing little importance as a market except for those interested in selling military supplies to opposing factions for purposes of civil war. A progressive and strong China could play a major role in the post-war world. A weak and disunited China might prove an apple of discord among its allies. Certainly there would be far less possibility of conflict between the United States, the U.S.S.R. and Britain over Chinese questions if there were a single Chinese régime, representing all patriotic elements, than if contending groups should fight for power behind the diplomatic façade of a National Government.

U.S. NEEDS A PROGRESSIVE CHINA. It becomes clearer with every passing day that the purposes of American Far Eastern policy cannot be served by an ineffective, backward China. The United States stands in need of a forward-looking Chinese Vichy agents, and otherwise assisted the Nazis before the allies invaded the continent on June 6. Yet de Gaulle on October 27 banned Spanish Republicans from a 12-mile-wide zone north of the Pyrenees, and during October Jacques Truelle, Gaullist agent, took over the French embassy in Madrid. De Gaulle's formal moves suggest a disposition to support the Spanish government which, appealing to the French desire for national sovereignty, declared on October 11 that raids from France were "compromising" the de Gaulle régime. Observers here and in London, however do not expect France to take positive steps in Franco's behalf.


HOSTILITY TO FRANCO IN LATIN AMERICA. The attitude the United States adopts toward the Spanish Republican attack on Franco can affect this country's relations with other American Republics. Franco Spain has been an instrument for spreading the totalitarian idea, and on January 8, 1941 the Madrid government created the *Consejo de Hispanidad* to extend Franco's influence throughout the Americas. Franco has sought close relationship with Argentina, and as early as the fall of 1942 broadcast to Argentina that his own and his listeners' countries "find themselves travelling the same road and . . . have parallel interests." The Moscow radio on October 22 accused the Spanish government of "shipping across the Atlantic to Latin America real Germans who arrive with the hope of reconstructing there the plans of government that failed in Europe." These Spanish activities have irked democratic spokesmen in the Americas. Foreign Minister Ezequiel Padilla of Mexico recently restated his government's policy of non-recognition of Franco, and the Cuban government of President Grau San Martín is considering a resolution presented by an all-party Congressional Committee to break off relations with Franco.

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Washington News Letter



GUERRILLA RAIDS REVEAL GROWING OPPOSITION TO FRANCO

The prospect that the rule of General Francisco Franco may be challenged by a revolt—inspired by the Supreme Junta of the Spanish National Union in Paris and carried out by armed Spanish guerrillas in southern France—poses problems for the United States both in international and in inter-American relations. The guerrillas, perhaps 15,000 in number, originally aided the French Forces of the Interior in the expulsion of the Germans, and are reported to have been making raids into Spain from the Pyrenees since October 4. The Supreme Junta—~~whose associated group, the National Union of Spain,~~ engaging in a new civil war against internal rivals.

It is no secret that while General Stilwell sought to bring a maximum of military aid into China and stressed the need for opening a land route between India and China, he was extremely careful to distribute supplies in a fashion guaranteeing their use against Japan. He most emphatically did not wish to see American aid used by Chinese groups or individuals in an internal political struggle. It also is clear that the United States Army has regretted a situation in which help could not be given to China's fighting guerrillas because of disunity between Chungking and the Eighteenth Group and New Fourth Armies.

DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS. Internationally speaking, the United States has taken the lead in bolstering the prestige of the Chungking government, and it is largely because of this country's efforts that China has been included in the top leadership of the United Nations. But, aware of the serious discrepancy between China's real strength and the diplomatic position recently accorded that country, Washington has sought to promote Chinese unity and the development of greater internal strength, so that China may ultimately join the Big Three in fact as well as in name.

America's purpose in backing Chungking has been to buttress the war effort against Japan, help the Chinese to become effective partners in the post-war Far East, and aid them in developing a large internal market which would be of value to the American economy. The alternative would be a weak China, emerging from the war exhausted, incapable of contributing to the maintenance of peace in the Far

United States is uncertain about its future moves with respect to Spain, the tendency in Britain is to favor a policy of no assistance to Franco. Meanwhile the Soviet Union has begun to rally Franco's Spanish enemies against the government.

Even in its present limited stage the anti-Franco movement raises immediate problems for France because of the raiders' reported use of French soil. On the one hand, the de Gaulle government tends to support the Spanish exiles because the Franco government put obstacles in the way of French refugees escaping through Spain from the Germans and from administration, firmly based in the democratic procedures of free speech and press, and genuinely able to speak for all important elements in the country. Such a Chinese régime would play a maximum part in defeating Japan, would be able to participate in measures to prevent the resurgence of Japanese militarism, and would know how to launch the agrarian and industrial reforms required if China is really to become a great market. To believe that these purposes can be achieved by a government which fails to take elementary steps toward a united, popular régime is to nurture illusions and close one's eyes to the enormous problems that face the United States in the Far East.

The United States has hitherto followed a two-fold course of supporting Chungking's war effort, while encouraging China to wage a more effective struggle. This general course is still sound, but the State Department presumably has been reviewing its policy toward China, considering ways of increasing its pressure on Chungking and of overcoming the difficulties posed by the course of the Chinese régime. The time has also come for the American public to re-examine its views on China and to advocate a realistic attitude toward the Chungking government.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

(The last in a series of articles on conditions in China.)

REMINDER: The U.S. Post Office has ruled that Christmas gift subscriptions for Army men abroad may be accepted during the current year only if the donor has received a letter requesting the subscription. No restrictions have been made on gift subscriptions to men in the Navy.

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN. Vol. XXIV, No. 3, NOVEMBER 3, 1944. Published weekly by the Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated. National Headquarters, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y. FRANK ROSS MCCOY, President; DOROTHY F. LEET, Secretary; VERA MICHELS DEAN, Editor. Entered as second-class matter December 2, 1921, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Three Dollars a Year. Please allow at least one month for change of address on membership publications.

F. P. A. Membership (which includes the Bulletin), Five Dollars a Year.
Produced under union conditions and composed and printed by union labor.